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I. Introduction
Generations of American school children have memorized the
words of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. Its evangelical
spirit was echoed in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and scores of
other presidential addresses. Perhaps partly on that account,
numerous Americans, perhaps especially American lawyers, have
since the 1780s presumed to tell other peoples how to govern
themselves. In 2003, the United States, not for the first time,
explained a military adventure as one motivated by the benign aim
of replacing a bad government with a good one. In fairness, it
might be noted that the Spanish,1 British,2 and Ottoman Empires3
tProfessor of Law, Duke University. This essay draws material from SPREADING
AMERICA'S WORD: STORIES OF ITS LAWYER-MISSIONARIES (2005). I am especially
grateful to Kristin Seeger for her excellent assistance in assembling it.
I WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO AND HISTORY OF
THE CONQUEST OF PERU 148-150, 636-638 (Cooper Square Press 2000) (1843) (Mexico
separately) (1847) (Peru separately).
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were similarly explained to their triumphant subjects as
humanitarian ventures, and that German intellectuals in 1914
explained the invasion of Belgium as necessitated by Germany's
duty to terminate the oppressive influence of the Czar's regime
that threatened the values of western society and was being
shielded by France.4
Many years before Jefferson wrote the Declaration, the poet
John Milton, reacting to the imperial impulse of his colleagues in
the English Parliament, told them that not words, nor money, nor
arms, but example was the one effective means to export English
ideas and values to distant peoples. In 1898, Milton's words were
repeated to Americans by James Bradley Thayer, the most eminent
constitutionalist of his day in opposing the initiation of America's
war with Spain; Thayer concluded: "Let not [America] forget her
precedence of teaching nations how to live.",5 Long before the
misadventure in Iraq, American experience had repeatedly
confirmed the wisdom of Milton's advice. Professor Woodrow
Wilson observed in 1908 that Americans ought to know that truth
more clearly than anyone as a result of our national experiences in
failed efforts to transform indigenous cultures or to reconstruct the
South after the Civil War.6 But as President, the former professor
Wilson forgot his own insight. His proclamation that "the world
2 Cf. Prime Minister William Gladstone: "We think that our country is a country
blessed with laws and a constitution that are eminently beneficial to mankind, and if so
what is more desired than that we should have the means of reproducing in different
portions of the globe something as like as may be to that country which we honor and
revere?" quoted by PAUL KNAPLUND, GLANDSTONE AND BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL POLICY 202
(George Allen 1927)
3 LORD KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH
EMPIRE 197-215 (1977). On traditional Islamic evangelism, see BETTY KELEN,
MOHAMMED: THE MESSENGER OF GOD 243-50 (1975).
4 See 1914 Manifesto of The Ninety Three German Intellectuals to the Civilized
World, Jorgen Ungern-Sternberg & Wolfgang Ungern-Stemberg, Der Autraf "An Die
Kulturvelt" 162-164 (Stuttgart 1996). German text available at,
http://www.nemst.de/kulturwelt.htm.
5 Quoting Milton: "'Let not England' said John Milton to Parliament in 1645,
forget her precedence of teaching nations how to live."' James Bradley Thayer, Our New
Possessions, 12 HARv. L. REV. 464, 465-66 (1899).
6 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 52-
53 (The Univ. of Columbia Press 1908). For a recent account of the expectations of
Reconstructionists, see WILLIAM L. BARNEY, BATTLEGROUND FOR THE UNION: THE ERA OF
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1848-1877 225-303 (1990).
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must be made safe for democracy ' '7 proved, as many foresaw, to
be a disservice to the cause it proclaimed.8
This essay is a brief account of the efforts of Americans who
sought to shape other nations not by war, but by writing, or
helping to write, their constitutions, a task that they were
sometimes asked to perform on behalf of those who were to be
governed by their words. 9 It will conclude that Milton and
Professor Wilson were correct, and President Wilson was wrong to
broadcast the contrary notion that democracy is just waiting to
happen if only a benign army would release it from an oppressive
force preventing its emergence. Constitutions work to provide
political stability if they reflect the inculturated notions of those
they govern, but not otherwise. This has, as Professor Wilson
observed a century ago, been a hard lesson for Americans to
learn.' In 2006, notwithstanding current events, the persistent
impulse to tell others how to govern themselves was once again
echoed in an address to the American Bar Association by a Justice
of the Supreme Court."l
While the idea of a written constitution enforced by national
courts was an American novelty, it was less novel than many may
suppose. Colonial America had been governed for a century and a
half in accord with diverse royal charters, and those charters had
on occasion been enforced against colonial legislatures by the
7 Woodrow Wilson, An Address to a Joint Session of Congress (April 2, 1917), in
41 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 525 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983) (recording entire
speech explaining the need to declare war against Germany).
8 See, e.g., the speech of Robert La Follette opposing the declaration of war. 55
CONG. RECORD, 6 51h Cong. I' Sess. 223-236 (1917). On the opposition to war expressed
by William Jennings Bryan, See LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH:
WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN: THE LAST DECADE 1915-1925 at 29-30 (New York 1965).
9 For more details on the experiences of legal missionaries, see CARRINGTON,
PAUL D., STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY (1999).
10 For a full statement of the imperialist impulse in democratic disguise, see
JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY 6-8
(1991); see also Statement of Principles, THE PROJECT FOR A NEW AMERICAN CENTURY
(1997), available at, http://www.newameficancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm.
That statement of the world's ripeness for an era of American imperial-democratic
government was signed by, among others, Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul
Wolfowicz, and Jeb Bush.
II For a video of Justice Kennedy's keynote address to the ABA on Aug. 5, 2006
see http://www.abavideonews.org/ABA374/audio-video.php.
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King's Privy Council.12 Eleven of the thirteen colonies were quick
in 1776 to re-write their charters as constitutions, with the
expectation of judicial enforcement.13  So the draftsmen at
Philadelphia who wrote the federal Constitution were not engaged
in totally creative handiwork. Nor was the Marshall Court when it
first invoked its power of judicial review. 14 But the invention of
the written constitution became an item for American legal
missionaries. Their efforts have generally proved harmless, but
they have seldom been noticeably effective in nurturing
democratic values, long-term political stability, or even conditions
favoring market economics.
The first American to undertake to write a constitution for
another nation was Governeur Morris, a New York lawyer who
was an important draftsman of the constitution published at
Philadelphia in 1787. Soon thereafter, he was in Paris advising
King Louis that what was needed to calm the melee in the streets
was a written constitution that he, Morris, was available to draft. 5
This suggestion was made at the same moment that Jefferson was
assisting the Marquis de Lafayette in drafting The Declaration of
the Rights of Man 6 purporting to capture the aims of the rising
revolution that was generating that melee. Neither Jefferson nor
Morris succeeded in creating peace where there could be no peace.
After them came Napoleon and one misadventure led to another.
II. Other Early Models of Constitutionalism
Without need of American help such as that offered to Louis
XVI by Morris, there would soon be numerous other national
12 See generally EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER, THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND IN
THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 1603-1784 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
1928) (discussing the relationship of the Privy Council with the Colonies).
13 For an account of early state constitutions, see generally JAMES Q. DEALEY
GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: FROM 1176 TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1914 (Da
Capo Press 1972) (1915).
14 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
15 RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOVERNEUR MORRIS, THE
RAKE WHO WROTE THE CONSTITUTION 125-126 (2003).
16 See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 380-381
(New York 1970). On Jefferson in France see R. R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICA AND EUROPE 1760-1800
250-51 (1959).
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constitutions somewhat fashioned on the American example. 17 In
1814, a national constitutional convention was gathered in
Norway, and its product remains in force today. 18 Belgium and the
Netherlands soon followed Norway in writing constitutions. Most
Latin American republics published written constitutions in the
1820s.' 9  All of these works bore some resemblance to the
American in the forms of the governments they created, but there
was little if any direct involvement of North Americans in shaping
those forms of government and little if any judicial enforcement of
the governing texts. Indeed some Latin America constitutions
were, perhaps of necessity, repeatedly rewritten.2 °
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a very different
American model could be seen in state constitutions being written
and ratified to confer much larger roles on voters to select directly
a range of officials including judges. 21 That model of popular self-
government has seldom if ever been replicated in other nations.
But many other national constitutions did follow. Chancellor
Bismarck promulgated a German constitution in 1871 to mark the
consolidation of the, German states that he had effected; it
prescribed separations of powers.22 Its forms may have been
influenced by the work of Francis Lieber, a Prussian-American,
who was earlier consulted by the Prussian government and who in
17 On older European constitutions, see THE CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE (E. A.
Goerner ed. Chicago 1967).
18 On American influence on the Norway constitution, see JAMES A. STORING,
NORWEGIAN DEMOCRACY 22-25 (1963).
19 For a brief account of Latin American constitutions, see RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON,
LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1974).
20 Id.
21 For the best contemporaneous account of the conventional wisdom regarding the
judicial power in the first half of the 1 9 th century FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND
TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 438-475 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1968)
(1848).
22 "The Imperial constitution of 1871 was a hotch-potch, hastily put together by
Bismarck to serve his own ends .... Show-piece of the constitution was the Reichstag,
elected by universal suffrage . . . The Reichstag could hold debates and could pass
(though not initiate) laws; its consent was necessary to the expenditure of money. But it
possessed no powers. The constitution laid down that the Imperial Chancellor was
"responsible" but it did not say to whom - certainly not to the Reichstag." A. J. P.
TAYLOR, THE COURSE OF GERMAN HISTORY: A SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
GERMANY SINCE 1815 131 (Routledge Classics 2001) (1945).
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1852 published a seminal work on comparative constitutional
law.23  In 1886, the Emperor of Japan gave his people a
constitution; it had been drafted by a German legal scholar. 24 It
established an elected Diet similar to the German parliament but
reserved almost absolute power to the Emperor.25 Yet a score of
young Japanese were sent to Ann Arbor to study constitutional law
with Thomas Cooley,26 and there were instances of Japanese
courts manifesting a measure of independence in the conduct of
cases brought by the government. 27 The Republic of Germany in
1919 ratified a new constitution drafted at Weimar that was among
the first to be judicially enforced.28 The Soviet constitution
published in 1924 proclaimed all manner of individual rights but
was merely hortatory; it was rewritten without apparent
consequence in 1936.29 More useful to shield individuals from
governmental excesses was the unwritten British constitution
fashioned in 1688 that conferred virtually absolute power on
Parliament, but subject to such constraints as its members might
observe as necessary to protect the traditional rights imbedded in
English morality.
One constitution radically different from the American is that
of the Republic of Turkey, created as it emerged from the Ottoman
Empire.3°  Its provisions separating church and state are
23 See FRANCIS LIEBER, On CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT (J.B. Lippincott
& Co. 1853); the work was republished three times, the last two were edited by
Theodore Woolsey, the president of Yale.
24 See EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 142 (3d ed., Alfred
A. Knopf 1981); and for an account of Western influences on modem Japan see
generally NEIL PEDLAR, THE IMPORTED PIONEERS: WESTERNERS WHO HELPED BUILD
MODERN JAPAN (1990).
25 FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 195 (1987)
26 This statement is derived from an examination of Michigan class pictures by the
author. A collection of photos of early Japanese alumni was hung in a classroom in 1978
and may still be there.
27 See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. BEER & JOHN M. MAKI, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH TO
DEMOCRACY: JAPAN'S Two CONSTITUTIONS, 1889-2002 104-105 (2002).
28 See DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL
SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 143-166 (Christian
Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003).
29 For a summary of the 1924 and 1936 constitutions, see ROBERT L. MADDOX
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 238 (Cong. Quarterly 1995).
30 Marcie J. Patton, Constitutionalism and Political Culture in Turkey in POLITICAL
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extraordinarily rigorous, and the primary instrument of its
enforcement is the military, whose officers are separately trained
and taught that enforcement of the constitution is their primary
professional duty, not that of mere lawyers and judges. However
improbable this may appear from an American perspective, this
seems in its own way to work, at least until the current controversy
resulting from the election of 2007.31
A. Liberia
The first American actually to write a constitution for others
was Simon Greenleaf, a Harvard law professor,3 2 who was
recruited by the American Colonization Society to provide a
suitable instrument for the former slaves being resettled in
Liberia.33 No fault seems to have been found in his work, but it
did not succeed in providing stable government over the longer
term. The relationship between European settlers and the
indigenous tribes of North America they dislocated foretold the
relationship between the African-American settlers of Liberia and
the indigenous tribes they dislocated. In hindsight, it is surprising
that a government fashioned by that Liberian ruling class would
endure as it did for more than a century. The Liberian constitution
of 1847 might therefore be deemed the most successful effort of
this kind.34
The idea of returning former slaves to Africa actually
antedated the Declaration of Independence. Two
Congregationalist ministers in New England sought in 1773 to
raise money to train emancipated slaves to spread the Christian
gospel in Africa. One of the two, Ezra Stiles, was President of
Yale, a lawyer as well as a minister, and the leader of the
emancipation movement in Connecticut. At the time, there was
CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 138 (Daniel P. Franklin
& Michael J. Baun eds., New York 1995).
31 See Vincent Boland, Draft Constitution Stirs Turkey Scarf Row, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at 4.
32 Greenleaf was the contemporary of Joseph Story and succeeded him as Dane
Professor. For a brief account of his career see ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT
HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN 1817-1967 at 122-123, 137, 149-50 (1967).
33 For the text and its evolution, see Alfonso K. Dormu THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1970).
34 Id.
20071
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substantial sentiment among freed slaves to return to Africa.35
This dream was made to seem attainable in 1815 when a New
England Quaker at his own expense transported thirty-eight
African-Americans to Sierra Leone on the west coast of Africa.
That event had inspired the creation of the Colonization Society in
1816. No doubt there were members of the Society who
envisioned involuntary deportation of former slaves, and later
abolitionists would attribute that purpose to the organization and
condemn its members for the brutality of such a scheme. But
there is no reason to doubt that many of the founders of the
Society, including Henry Clay and James Madison, simply aimed
to bring a peaceable end to slavery in the South, such as had been
achieved by gradual emancipation in the North in the last years of
the 18th century, a process that also fell far short of full liberation
for many slaves. The charter of the Colonization Society drafted
by Clay committed them to voluntary resettlement only. They
were optimistic that former slaves would prefer a country of their
own, as for a time many did.
The Society made a false start at settling former slaves in
Sierra Leone. The previously re-settled former English slaves did
not relish an invasion of lowly former American slaves, and likely
had their hands full working out a relationship with the indigenous
population, a problem that seems not to have been fully resolved.
36
So the Society made a deal for some land in what was to become
Liberia, and the first settlers reached that place in April 1821."
Each year for forty years, many additional immigrants would
arrive and immigration would continue throughout the 1 9 th
century, but at a much reduced level after 1860. As late as the
1850s, some black leaders were still encouraging emigration to
Liberia, despite growing repugnance to the scheme on the part of
many abolitionists.
35 For brief accounts of the Colonization Society see LEONARD I. SWEET, BLACK
IMAGES OF AMERICA, 1784-1870 at 23-34 (1976); FLOYD J. MILLER, THE SEARCH FOR A
BLACK NATIONALITY: BLACK EMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION 1787-1863 3-20 (1975).
36 Lansana Gberie, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA: THE RUF AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF SIERRA LEONE (2005).
37 See generally Tom W. Shick, BEHOLD THE PROMISED LAND: A HISTORY OF
AFRO-AMERICAN SETiTLER SOCIETY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERIA (1980); Yekutiel
Gershoni, BLACK COLONIALISM: THE AMERICO-LIBERIAN SCRAMBLE FOR THE
HINTERLAND (1985).
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The black settlers in Africa, who became known as Americo-
Liberians, resembled the European settlers of North America in
both the manners and habits they tended to affect as well as in
their relationship to the indigenous peoples. The Liberian land
and climate were not generally conducive to agriculture;
consequently most of the indigenous tribes were hunters and
gatherers, not unlike many tribes populating North America, and
sparsely distributed over the country. Americo-Liberian settlers
made land deals at low prices, dislocating these diverse tribes.
While some, particularly the members of a Moslem group, were
more literate than many of the settlers, no indigenous tribes were
literate in, or could speak, English, which was the uniting tongue
of the settlers.
As the English-speaking settlers established themselves as a
ruling class, the nearby indigenous families started to place their
children in the households of the settlers as servants. As practiced,
the relationship between master and servant was a step or two
above chattel slavery. In that role, the "pawns" could be educated
as settlers and thus made eligible for assimilation into the ruling
class by marriage. The settler population was also increased by an
infusion of "Congoes." These were newly captured slaves
liberated by the United States Navy to prevent their delivery to the
United States. They were brought to Liberia in the hope that they
might be assimilated there, although few if any had acquired
American habits, manners, or language.
Until 1847, the colony was governed from afar by the
American Colonization Society. After 1839, there was a
government of the Commonwealth of Liberia with a governor
appointed by the Society, but a deputy governor who was locally
elected by the Americo-Liberians. The indigenous ethnic groups
were not invited to participate in governance. Their votes were no
more welcome to the settlers than the settlers' own votes had been
in the Southern states from which they had emigrated.
It became increasingly necessary for Liberia to settle
international relations with the neighboring British and French
empires. The Colonization Society proposed making the area an
American colony, but the proposal received no support from the
United States Congress. Consequently, in 1847, a Republic was
proclaimed, with a constitution resembling that of the United
States drafted by the American jurist by Simon Greenleaf in
2007]
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Cambridge. Joseph Jenkins Roberts, a native of Petersburg,
Virginia was the first President elected by the Americo-Liberians
to serve in the capital in Monrovia. While President Roberts was
not professionally trained, he, like many frontiersmen in America
and in Liberia, acquired a measure of understanding and of
commitment to the mission of bringing democratic law to his new
and benighted land.
Monrovia in the 1840s and 1850s was an attractive capital.
The most prosperous settlers resided in stone homes. The
economy was supported in part by the aid of the Colonization
Society. But the Colonization Society, in part as a result of the
vigorous oppositions of abolitionists, became moribund after
1850,. For a while, Liberia profitably supplied camwood for use
in the dye industry. A profitable sugar industry, followed by a
coffee industry also developed, but none of these proved viable
over the longer term. There were gold and diamonds, but not
enough to justify the expense of mining. With no capital and little
enterprise, the Liberian economy languished. In the latter years of
the 1 9 th century, some African-American entrepreneurs and
benefactors began to take an interest in the country, but not
sufficiently to generate a healthy national economy.38
The exclusion of indigenous people from the electorate was
manifestly at odds with the vision expressed in Jefferson's
Declaration and reflected in the text of the Liberian constitution.
While this dissonance was recognized, it was not until 1884 that
serious thought was given to enfranchising the indigenous peoples.
Then, the idea was laid aside, apparently in fear that Americo-
Liberian civilization would be subjugated to native paganism or
Islam. The cultural, religious, and class gulf was believed too
wide and too deep to permit the mutual trust required to share
political power.
Among the continuing sources of conflict between the settlers
and the indigenous peoples was the interest of some of the latter in
continuing the slave trade. Some indigenous entrepreneurs viewed
the settlers' abolitionism as a threat to a mainstay of their
economy. Opinion among the settlers was not universal either,
indeed, some Americo-Liberian settlers maintained slave
38 John Hope FRANKLIN & Alfred A. Moss, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 167-68, 306-07 (7
th ed. McGraw Hill 1994).
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plantations of their own notwithstanding the disapproval of their
fellow settlers. There were also conflicts over control of land and
natural resources. As in North America, there was chronic war
between the settlers and some of the indigenous tribes over such
issues. Indigenous ethnic groups were forcibly relocated, if not so
dramatically as President Jackson removed the Cherokee from
Georgia, a brutal event not constrained by the Constitution of the
United States.39
The laws enacted by the Liberian legislature were enforced,
but often at the convenience, and the profit, of commissioners
appointed by the President and serving at his pleasure. There was
in each county a Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas.
Any deficiency in professionalism among the judges was partly
ameliorated by the use of trial by jury in civil cases in accordance
with American practice. Only in the 2 0 th century did there begin
to appear the rudiments of a trained legal profession. In that
respect, the Republic of Liberia may have been in a weaker
position than its indigenous peoples who had customary legal
institutions administered by men of status in their respective ethnic
groups. Even the enforcement of simple contracts was said to be
problematic in the Liberian county courts.
There is no need to recount all the difficulties encountered by
Liberia over the next century. It wasn't until the revolution of
1980 when the Americo-Liberian domination of Liberia formally
ended. 40 The elected leaders were all murdered, and more than a
few of the descendants of the settlers migrated back to the United
States as Liberia descended into chaos. 41  Their remaining kin
constituted only about two and a half percent of the population
counted in the 2002 census.
The relationship of black settlers in Liberia to the indigenous
peoples who were also black was not fundamentally different from
39 For an account of the litigation, see Jill NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE
CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND POLITICS (Univ. of OK Press 2004) (1996); for a
recounting of the story see generally John T. EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE CHEROKEE NATION (1988).
40 On the revolution of 1980 and subsequent events, see generally STEPHEN ELLIS,
THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION
OF AN AFRICAN CIVIL WAR (1999); MARY H. MORAN, LIBERIA: THE VIOLENCE OF
DEMOCRACY (2006).
41 Charles Hill, Distant Land, Shared History, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2003, at Al.
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that of white settlers in North America to the indigenous people
generally described as red. There was less homicide and slavery
than in America, but only limited integration. And, in Africa, in
the end, the indigenous ethnic groups prevailed because the
settlers lacked the numbers and resources to prevent that outcome
B. Hawaii
Hawai'i presented the next opportunity in constitution drafting.
The indigenous Hawaiian population was among the very last in
1778 to encounter visitors of European extraction, so remote were
their islands.42 As elsewhere, this contact was devastating. While
interaction was seldom overtly violent exposure to the germs and
viruses imported by the new settlers decimated a population who
had developed no immunities. 4' The resident royalty recognized
the need for the help of immigrants in dealing with imperial
powers. For some time, immigrants from America occupied the
posts of attorney general and chief justice, while the foreign
minister to the king was often British. The first chief justice,
William Little Lee, studied law at Harvard with Simon Greenleaf
and practiced law in Troy, New York.' Developing respiratory
problems, he set out for Oregon in hope of finding relief. Sailing
to Oregon, albeit circuitously, he encountered Honolulu and
remained there for a decade, becoming an effective lawyer-
missionary. He died in 1857 at the age of thirty-six.45
In his decade in Hawai'i, Lee was employed by the King in
numerous roles, including drafting a constitution, a civil code, and
a criminal code, and serving as the kingdom's first chief justice.
He advocated the rule of law, universal male suffrage, and the
rights of kanakas and foreigners to own land. He is said to have
been "inspired by complex motives: paternalistic concern for the
Hawaiians seen as children; moral commitment to the rule of law;
capitalist desires for wealth. 46
42 For a good account of the discovery see Edward Joesting, HAWAII: AN
UNCOMMON HISTORY 25-40 (1972).
43 See Jared Diamond, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
195-215 (1999).
44 See Sally Engle Merry, COLONIZING HAWAI'I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW 3-
7 (2000).
45 Id. at 6.
46 Id.
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The constitution Lee wrote was proclaimed by the monarch
and ratified by voters in 1852. 47 An advisory parliament formed
on the 18th century British model had emerged from the traditional
meetings of upperclass ali'i. Under the Lee constitution, all male
citizens were enfranchised to elect its members. Some of those
elected were naturalized subjects or, increasingly, natives of mixed
ancestry. Many indigenous people remained skeptical of the
advice given their royalty by the naturalized advisors and were not
inclined to participate in democratic elections, but the constitution
surely reduced the exposure to imperial domination.
The sale of land to foreigners was recognized by many as a
threat to customary life styles of the indigenous population. But
Kamehameha III decided, on the advice of the elected parliament,
to dissolve the feudal system and allow land to be sold.aS One
reason was that the shortage of kanakas and slaves resulted in
returns to the ali'i insufficient to maintain their lifestyles. The
king authorized most ali'i to record their land titles, and
authorized a massive auction of their lands. While the principal
beneficiary of the auction was the royal treasury, it also enabled
some of the ali'i to retire their debts and others to consume more
goods.
While only Hawaiians could participate as purchasers in the
initial auction, many were Hawaiians of foreign ancestry. Some of
the land was resold to citizens or subjects of foreign countries who
were not naturalized. Only one percent of that sold was acquired
by "the common people," i.e., the kanakas. At least one
missionary, C. P. Judd, protested bitterly that "[t]he sovereignty is
the soil" and any scheme to sell it to citizens of the United States
(but not to naturalized citizens) was therefore objectionable.
However, the prevailing view among the missionaries was that the
right to buy and sell land was necessary if "the Hawaiian race"
were ever to "rise to the habits of industry."49 Certainly it was
difficult for Americans whose ancestors had bought land from
Native Americans at bargain prices to see evil in such exercises of
47 See Gavan Daws, SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 184-
185 (1968) (describing the history of the Hawaiian constitution of 1852).
48 Marshall D. Sahlins, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN POLYNESIA 124-135 (Univ. of
WA Press 1958).
49 Id. at 133;. see also U.S. House of Rep., Foreign Relations of the United States,
1894: Affairs in Hawaii, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 53-1, pt. 1, at 106 (1895).
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the human right to freedom of contract, anymore than the
Americo-Liberians had seen a moral problem in buying for a song
the lands of indigenous Africans. If indigenous peoples made
poor decisions about investing the proceeds of their land sales, that
was not a concern of the buyers, on the frontier, in Africa, or in the
islands.
The great auction did not immediately produce new wealth,
but within two decades the lands sold were producing for export
large quantities of sugar and pineapple, and had become some of
the most valuable agricultural lands on the planet. The kanakas
participated very little in this new agriculture. They were not only
diminished in number but were perceived to be not very
industrious workers. Additional workers were therefore needed to
harvest the more difficult crops. Peasants were brought in from
China, Japan, Korea, Puerto Rico, Portugal, and the Philippines to
do what needed to be done.5°
Lee's 1852 constitution did not survive the resulting turmoil.
It was replaced in 1864 as a result of a coup.51 Monarchists and
others fearing the influx of foreign workers proposed formidable
property qualifications for voting. When a convention called to
ratify that amendment proved unwilling to disenfranchise the
people, the King simply proclaimed a new constitution with the
desired revision. This action opened a deep divide in the
parliament between monarchists, most of whom were indigenous,
and republicans, most of whom were foreign-born and spoke
English. Their sessions were conducted bilingually and seldom in
good temper.
But Lee would not be the last person with American ties to
write an Hawaiian constitution. In 1872, the last direct descendant
of the imperial Kamehameha died; his successors were all elected
by parliament as provided by the 1864 constitution. The second of
these was David Kalakaua; his election in 1873 evoked a riot that
was stilled with the help of American and British sailors anchored
in the harbor.5 2 He lived well, and beyond his means. In 1886, he
50 See Lawrence Fuchs, HAWAII PONO, A SOCIAL HISTORY (1961) (recounting the
immigration and assimilation of foreign workers in Hawaii).
51 Daws, supra note 47, at 185.
52 Joesting, supra note 42, at 209-2 10.
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made a comical effort to add Samoa to his empire. 3 When that
failed, he went on a tour of Europe. The New York Times reported
that he planned to sell his kingdom to pay his debts, leading the
American State Department to advise the countries he visited that
any such sale would be a breach of its reciprocity treaty with
Hawai 'i.
54
In 1887, his parliament, inspired by these events and led by
men mostly of foreign ancestry or birth, but including some of
primarily native ancestry, forced the spendthrift king to accept a
new constitution franchising all male residents of the islands save
those born in Asia (the exception not made in William Little Lee's
constitution of 1852), making the government accountable to the
legislature, and providing abundant guarantees of property rights.
When Kalakaua rejected the proposed draft and called out his
House Troop to defend his royal prerogatives, parliament was
supported by the Honolulu Rifles, a volunteer group most of
whose members were of European descent. Kalakaua backed
down. This "bayonet constitution" (as it become known to some
of the king's supporters) reduced the democratically elected king
to a figurehead role similar to that of British monarchs of that
time." Although bayonets were employed as a threat, no one was
harmed and the change was accomplished without sustained
protest by subjects loyal to the monarchy. The new constitution
was approved by a resounding vote of those people other than the
many thousands of naturalized Asian subjects who were excluded
from the electorate.
When Kalakaua died in 1892, Parliament selected his sister
Lili'uokalani as Queen despite the fact that a coup had been
attempted in her name only three years earlier. She still had the
support of a monarchist group, the Native Sons of Hawaii, many
of whom had supported her attempted coup.5 6 She informed her
53 For accounts of the Samoan misadventure see generally J. W. DAVIDSON, SAMOA
Mo SAMOA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF WESTERN SAMOA (1967);
Paul M. Kennedy, Germany and the Samoan Tridominium, 1889-98, in GERMANY IN THE
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1870-1914 at 89 (John A. Moses & Paul M. Kennedy eds. 1977).
54 Joesting, supra note 42, at 214.
55 See Merze TATE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM: A
POLITICAL HISTORY 86-93 (1965).
56 For a comprehensive account of the attempted coup, see Daws, supra note 47, at
264-280.
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cabinet that she would (in the manner of 1864) dismiss parliament
and proclaim a new constitution reclaiming the powers ceded in
"the bayonet constitution" by her predecessor. She was advised
by her cabinet that this would embolden parliament to proclaim a
republic. The popular approval of the constitution in 1887
indicated to some that she lacked the support needed to impose a
powerful monarchy on an increasingly diverse population many of
whose members expected to govern themselves. Although two of
her ministers refused to sign the order, she ordered parliament to
dissolve, announcing that she would proclaim a new constitution
"in a few days."
While matters were in this state, annexationists in the
parliament, as foretold by the Queen's advisors, seized the
moment.57 They were led by three native lawyers all of whom
were grandchildren of the Congregationalist missionaries who had
converted the royal family to their faith in 1819: Sanford Ballard
Dole, Lorrine Andrews Thurston, and William Owen Smith. Dole
had read law in an office in Boston and been admitted to the bar in
Massachusetts before returning home to practice in Honolulu.
Thurston had studied law with Theodore Dwight at Columbia
University before returning to practice law. Smith had read law in
Honolulu.
Following the example of King Kalakaua in 1873, the
annexationists sought the support of the American minister, John
Levitt Stevens, a journalist by trade. Stevens summoned 162
sailors from an American ship, ostensibly to protect American
citizens in the expected mayhem, but he stationed them around a
government building, not around Americans or their property, and
thus protected the annexationists. Although he denied complicity
with the annexationists, the conduct of Stevens was rightly seen as
a violation of international law. On that account and because it
rejected the idea of American imperialism, Congress refused to
annex the islands as a colonial territory.
The Republic of Hawai'i was thus left to fend for itself. On
July 4, 1894, a new and plutocratic constitution drafted by the
Dole and other "Americo-Hawaiians" (known in Hawaii as
haoles) was proclaimed, one that limited the voting franchise to
those who could read, write, and speak English, and limited office
57 Joesting,supra note 42 at 235-237.
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holding to those with substantial property.
In 1898, while the United States was at war with Spain,
annexation was at last approved by a joint resolution of Congress
making all Hawaiians citizens of the United States and forbidding
constraints on suffrage by the territorial government.5 8 Congress
had resigned itself to the imperial role. Hawaii would not again
have its own constitution until statehood came in 1961.
C. Cuba
The war with Spain was occasioned by a revolution on the
island of Cuba that had raged for the last quarter of the 1 9 th
century, largely maintained on behalf of peasants and slaves, and
with much Jeffersonian rhetoric.5 9 Some of its advocates came to
reside in the United States. William Randolph Hearst's and other
newspapers provided horrifying accounts of the many brutalities
perpetrated in Spanish concentration camps on the impoverished
revolutionaries and their kin. Among the responses, if William
Randolph Hearst's journalists can be believed, was that of 600
Sioux braves who offered to gather every Spanish scalp on the
island. 60  Feeling pressed, President McKinley announced in
December 1897 that American patience with Spain's governance
of Cuba was "not infinite." In February, the press somehow
acquired and published a letter written by the Spanish Ambassador
to the United States to his superiors in Madrid commenting on
McKinley's speech and describing the President as "weak and a
bidder for the admiration of the crowd." This led to the
resignation of the Ambassador and heightened pressure on
McKinley.61 And on February 15, the battleship Maine exploded
while on a peaceful visit to Havana. Many seamen died in the
explosion. The Navy could not explain the cause, and it was
rumored that it was the result of a deliberate act by Spain or by
58 See William Adam Russ, THE HAWAIIAN REPUBLIC (1894-1898) AND ITS
STRUGGLE TO WIN ANNEXATION (Susquehanna Univ. Press 1992) (1961).
59 See SLAVES, SUGAR AND COLONIAL SOCIETY: TRAVEL ACCOUNTS OF CUBA 1801 -
1899 (Louis A. Perez Jr. ed., Scholarly Resources 1992).
60 See G. J. A. O'Toole, THE SPANISH WAR: AN AMERICAN EPIC - 1898 at 165
(Norton 1984); and see generally CHARLES H. BROWN, THE CORRESPONDENTS' WAR:
JOURNALISTS IN THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (Scribner 1967).
61 ROBERT DALLEK, 1898: MCKINLEY'S DECISION, THE UNITED STATES DECLARES
WAR ON SPAIN (Chelsea House 1969).
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Cubans hoping to provoke intervention.
Congress demanded action.62 McKinley complied by serving
an ultimatum on Spain demanding liberation of Cuba. When that
was not forthcoming, war was declared by Congress.63 The
resolution recognized a Republic of Cuba as "the true and lawful
government of that island." It was approved by a vote of 67 to 21.
Leading the opposition was Orville Platt, a Republican
representing Connecticut. 64 Platt was a man given to learning,
who, we are told, spent his evenings reading Greek literature aloud
to his wife. His objection to the declaration of war was that it
recognized a Republic of Cuba; while affirming that "the time has
come when Spanish rule in Cuba must cease," he denied that there
was a government in Cuba that could be recognized and insisted
that the United States military would have to remain there until it
was satisfied that a responsible government was in place.
The "splendid little war" against Spain lasted only 118 days. It
resulted in few casualties and the lionization of Theodore
Roosevelt.65 Cuba was occupied by the United States Army, the
concentration camps were opened, and a government was
established under the command of General Leonard Wood, a
medical doctor who favored the annexation of Cuba. Wood
proved to be highly energetic in imposing reforms on the Cuban
people.66 His administration rid the city of yellow fever by
exterminating the mosquitoes carrying the infection. It built
sewers, paved streets, and turned parks into gardens. It whipped
people for defecating in the streets. By such means, it greatly
relieved the squalor that the Spanish Empire had been powerless to
reduce. By 1902, Havana may have been the healthiest city in the
western hemisphere. The occupation government also erected
over 3000 school buildings throughout the island, creating a
62 See H.G. RICKOVER, HOW THE BATTLESHIP MAINE WAS DESTROYED (Naval Inst.
Press 1976) (describing the destruction and aftermath of the destruction of the Battleship
Maine).
63 55th Cong. Ch. 189; 30 Stat. 364.
64 See generally LouIs A. COOLIDGE, AN OLD-FASHIONED SENATOR: ORVILLE H.
PLATT OF CONNECTICUT; THE STORY OF A LIFE UNSELFISHLY DEVOTED TO THE PUBLIC
SERVICE (Kennikat Press 1910).
65 See O'ToOLE, supra note 60, at 17.
66 See Whitney T. Perkins, CONSTRAINT OF EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND
CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS 6-11 (1981).
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challenge to the government of the forthcoming republic to find
teachers to staff them.
But in 1901, as a means of prodding the establishment of a
democratic republic, Senator Platt attached a rider to the military
appropriations bill directing the War Department to secure the
agreement of the Republic of Cuba (when established) to the
condition that the United States would have an obligation to
intervene if and when democratic self-government on the island
failed.6 7 William Jennings Bryan and other anti-imperialists
strenuously disapproved the Platt Amendment. Its terms were
nevertheless forced into the Cuban Constitution of 1902 and into
the treaty between the United States and Cuba.
Thus, at the behest of the Senate, the new Cuban constitution
contained a provision bearing some resemblance to the provision
of the Constitution of the United States guaranteeing a republican
form of government. The guarantor in both constitutions was the
United States, but Cuba was not a member of that federation. On
its face, as Bryan and others emphasized, this was a serious affront
to the right to self-government. On the other hand, even in 1902 it
was evident that a republic serving people who had so recently and
for so long been deeply divided by class and by religion was
inherently very unstable. It was not unreasonable to seek some
means of introducing a measure of stability.
The Platt Amendment had the unwelcome effect on Cuban
domestic politics specifically foreseen by its critics, and begot
precisely the sorts of disorder that it had been intended to
prevent.68 A government of religious conservatives had been
elected in 1902 and re-elected in 1906. But the religious liberals
questioned the vote count in the re-election. The result was
violent disorder and the resignation of the government. Both sides
were thus seeking the return of the United States Marines: the
conservatives wanted the United States military to return to
suppress the disorder, while the liberals sought their return in
order to conduct an honest election. Only days before this
outbreak of violence, Secretary of State Elihu Root had concluded
a tour of Latin America proclaiming that "[w]e wish for no
67 Id. at 7-12; Edward S. Kaplan, UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA:
BRYAN'S CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS, 1900-1920 at 12-13 (1998).
68 Perkins, supra note 66, at 12-15.
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victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own, for no
sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves."6 9 The Marines
immediate return to resolve the chaos in Cuba was more than a
little embarrassing. An American Provisional Governor was
appointed to serve under the Cuban flag. Cuba would be fully
liberated a second time in 1908. But problems would recur in
1912, 1917, and 1920 leading to successive "liberations." It
became evident that the Amendment had contributed to a
demoralization of Cuban politics. The arrangement was at last
abrogated in 1934.70 However, it is not clear that the subsequent
history of Cuba would have been far different had there been no
Platt Amendment and no effort on the part of the United States to
impart its political values to those governing the island.
In Cuba, the decision of 1934 did little to assure constitutional
democracy and legal rights on the island. Iron rule would soon be
imposed by Fulgencio Batista and a few decades later by Fidel
Castro. For the remainder of the 201h century, Cubans seeking
democracy and individual rights would have to come to the United
States to find them.
D. The Philippines
It was not clear to most Americans why the United States had
liberated the Philippines in 1898. Unlike in Cuba there had been
no popular clamor in the United States about the brutalities of the
Spanish Empire in that venue. While there were rebels in the
Philippines, American journalists had not discovered them and
distributed their stories.71 The gentle President McKinley
acknowledged that he had been deeply troubled by the issues of
imperialism and had prayed for wisdom in deciding what to do
with the Philippines. His prayer, he told a religious group, had
been answered by God, who advised him that America could not
honorably return the Philippines to Spain, nor could it allow the
Germans to take them (as indeed Germany gave substantial
evidence of intending to do), and it was therefore a moral duty of
69 See Janice Hepworth, A Policy of "Practical Altruism," 3 J. OF INTER-AMERICAN
STUDIES 411413 (1961).
70 See Luis E. AGUILAR, CUBA 1933: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (1972).
71 See Alfred Whitney GRISWOLD, THE FAR EASTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES 18-19 (Brace & Co. 1962) (1938).
[Vol. XXXII
WRITING OTHER PEOPLES' CONSTITUTIONS
the United States to govern and protect the islands and prepare the
people for self-governance.72 Others supported this decision, over
the vigorous protest of many anti-imperialists.73 What ensued was
the most sustained effort so far undertaken by the United States to
supply another nation with an American form of government. It
was not a total failure, but neither was it a success.
There was much debate over what to do with the islands.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the former Harvard law dean and
a sometime Wall Street lawyer, and a man seldom moved to
express interest in political issues, joined in the debate to explain
that some provisions of the Constitution of the United States
would apply to new "possessions," but that the instrument posed
no obstacle to their acquisition. He piously cautioned that:
If we are to undertake the government of dependent countries,
with any hope of gaining credit for ourselves, we must enter
upon the task with a single eye to promoting the interests of the
people governed, and we must content ourselves with such
material advantages as may accrue to us incidentally from a
faithful discharge of our duty.74
Whatever the merits of the arguments, they were subordinated
by the deeds of Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. Aguinaldo had been
leading a Filipino revolution against Spain, and in 1899 redirected
his militancy against the United States. 75 For seven years, a war
was waged, roughly on the scale of the better remembered Viet
Nam venture. Whatever hope of national dignity some Americans
nourished in their support of the imperial venture was substantially
dispelled by this squalid struggle.
72 See CHARLES S. OLcOTr, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY VOL. 2 109-111
(1916).
73 See O'Toole, supra note 60, at 191-192, 223, 364-366 (describing the
background on the German threat); see also JOHN R. Dos PASSOS, A DEFENSE OF THE
MCKINLEY ADMINISTRATION FROM ATTACKS OF CARL SCHURZ AND OTHER ANTI-
IMPERIALISTS (1900) (expressing support for the retention of the islands); see also
ROBERT L. BEISNER, TWELVE AGAINST EMPIRE: THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS: 1898-1900
(McGraw-Hill 1968) (accounting the criticism of McKinley's decision).
74 Christopher Columbus Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 365,392 (1899).
75 See also STUART C. MILLER, "BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION:" THE AMERICAN CONQUEST
OF THE PHILIPPINES: 1899-1903 (1982); JOHN DOBSON, RETICENT EXPANSIONISM: THE
FOREIGN POLICY OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 142-146 1988); See generally DAVID H. BAIN,
SITTING IN DARKNESS: AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES (1984).
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Because of the relative size and complexity of the Philippines
and the continuing insurrection, no election was held there until
1907. President McKinley picked as the first American viceroy a
federal judge and law school dean in Cincinnati, William Howard
Taft, whose qualifications seem to have been his formidable
intellect, his enormous size, and his geniality. As Governor of the
Philippines, Taft was chair of a seven-member governing
commission appointed by the President.76 That commission
remained in place for thirty years as the Executive branch of the
territorial government. It was Secretary Root who drafted its
directive, and there was little in it to which one might object. His
orders were to establish the rule of law and individual freedom.
The Filipinos would be required to accept these principles "for the
sake of their liberty and happiness." Yet, the Commission
should bear in mind that the government they are establishing is
designed not for our satisfaction, but for the happiness, peace,
and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs,
their habits, and even their prejudices.77
Root's directive was sometimes observed, but concerns for the
propagation of American ideas and values frequently seemed to
dovetail with American economic interests.
In 1901, the Supreme Court of the Philippines was established
to replace the Audencia established by the Spanish Empire.78 The
Audencia of Manila had sometimes exercised authority as the
executive and sometimes served as a legal advisor to the Viceroy,
when there was one. The Audencias when sitting as courts had
been subject to appellate review by a court sitting in Madrid, and
so it was expected that the Supreme Court of the Philippines was
likewise subjected to appellate review by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Privately, Taft described the ruling class caciques, "as
ambitious as Satan and quite as unscrupulous," and the peasant
76 On Taft's service on the Philippine Commission, see HENRY F. .PRINGLE, THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HowARD TAFT Vol. 1 159-256 (1939).
77 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 1845-1909 356 (1938).
78 See A Credible Supreme Court Celebrates its 105 'h Anniversary on June 11,
2006. MANILA BULLETIN, June 11, 2006, http://www.mb.com.ph/issues/2006/06/11/
SPRT2006061166515.html. For a celebration of its centennial in 2001, see
http://www.opnet.ops.gov.ph/ops-speeches2001.htm.
[Vol. XXXI
WRITING OTHER PEOPLES' CONSTITUTIONS
taos as "utterly unfit: for self-government., 79 The cacique families
were generally descendants of Spanish dons. They maintained
feudal estates that were increasingly prosperous as a result of the
sugar quota guaranteeing their owners profitable of exports to the
American market. As Taft observed, American efforts "to uplift
the ignorant" got little sympathy from caciques.80 Many practiced
extortion and embezzlement, habits that had been tolerated for
centuries by viceroys from Madrid. Filipino judges shamelessly
punished innocent rivals and exonerated their kinsmen and friends
of obvious guilt, often falsely attributing their corrupt decisions to
orders from American officers.8 1
As in Liberia, Hawai'i and Cuba, differences of class were
reinforced by racial and ethnic differences. The caciques, while
descendants of dons, were generally mestizo of indigenous and
Chinese origins. The taos whom they held in peonage were
members of numerous ethnic groups who spoke in as many as
eighty different languages or dialects sufficiently distinct to
preclude communication among them. Also, religious differences
were keenly felt. One American from long experience observed
that
[N]on-Christian tribes have two things in common-their
unwillingness to accept the Christian faith and their hatred of the
several Filipino peoples who profess it. Their animosity is
readily understood when it is remembered that their ancestors
and they themselves have suffered grievous wrongs at the hands
of the Filipinos. 2
Indeed, the Moros, who were Muslims, spoke their own
language and were matriarchal in their sexual mores, were deeply
offended if described as Filipinos, a tribe whom they reviled.
Ethnic groups on the large southern island of Mindanao felt no
connection to those of Luzon, the large northern island. In 1906,
there was a new civil war in the South waged by people having no
79 Stanley Karnow, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA'S EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 231
(1989).
80 DEAN C. WORCHESTER, THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT 661 (Macmillan
1914).
81 KATHERINE MAYO, THE ISLES OF FEAR: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES 10-
15 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1925).
82 See Dean C. Worcester, THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT 660-661
(Macmillian 1914).
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connection to Aguinaldo, and requiring yet another dispatch of
military forces.83
When Woodrow Wilson, was elected to the presidency in
1912, many Filipinos expected a transfer of sovereignty to
themselves, for many Democratic legislators had professed to
favor such a transfer. And some may even have read the book of
Professor Wilson in which he had cautioned against the imperial-
missionary impulse. Moreover, Wilson had named William
Jennings Bryan as his Secretary of State, and Bryan had
campaigned against imperialism as a presidential candidate in
1896, 1900 and 1908, and had in 1898 vigorously opposed the
retention of the Philippines.84
As President, Wilson studied the issue of Philippine
sovereignty and then accepted the advice of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs in the War Department. That advice was formulated by a
knowledgeable military general and his aide, Felix Frankfurter,
then a recent graduate of the Harvard Law School. Frankfurter
rightly perceived that the Filipino elite had "little community of
interest and little sympathy ' 85 with the people, and that it would be
necessary to broaden the political base before sovereignty could be
relinquished to a government in democratic form. Wilson had
himself expressed a like view as early as 1902. He was critical of
Aguinaldo's American supporters and proclaimed that the
Filipinos "are children and we are men in these deep matters of
government and justice. 86  Wilson appointed Francis Burton
Harrison, a Congressman from New York, as Governor General of
the Philippines. Harrison had been a student of Wilson's at the
New York Law School and had for a time taught in that
institution. He had also served with Roosevelt in Cuba as a
member of the New Yorkers' Rough Rider Regiment.
Arriving in Manila in 1913, Harrison was soon genuinely
enamored of Filipinos.87 He brought word that America would
surrender sovereignty and that "[e]very step we take will be taken
83 Id. 457-458.
84 Id. at 339-384.
85 Karnow, supra note 79, at 243.
86 Id.
87 Anne Cipriano Venzon, Francis Burton Harrison, 10 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 208 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
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with a view to the ultimate independence of the islands. 88 He
promptly began to replace American administrators appointed by
Taft with Filipinos; the number of Americans in the government
diminished from three thousand to six hundred.89 Indeed, he
proceeded at a pace somewhat frightening to those who shared the
concern expressed by Frankfurter or who feared the
aggressiveness of the Empire of Japan. Even Manuel Quezon, the
leader of the nationalists expressed concern about the loss of the
American administrators and their replacement by self-seeking
natives whose notions of public service were based on their
observations of the conduct of the corrupt Spanish viceroys. 90
Congress nevertheless ratified President Wilson's promise of
future independence in 1916. Years later, Harrison would return
to advise the Filipino government, be named the first honorary
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, and be buried in Manila.
Bryan was succeeded as Secretary of State in 1915 by Robert
Lansing, who had been previously involved in East Asian matters.
Lansing proposed the transfer of the Philippines to Japan, partly as
a means of calming the Japanese appetite for expansion on the
continent of Asia, and partly because he regarded continuing
American involvement in the Philippines as a signal of imperial
ambitions evoking mistrust on the part of other nations, especially
Japan, a nation he regarded as a much more attractive market for
American goods than the Philippines. 9' He also regarded the
democratization of Philippine society improbable at best. It is
possible that such a transfer might have been made in September
1917 when Lansing engaged in extensive negotiations with the
Japanese, but in light of the collapse of Russia and entry of both
Japan and the United States into the European war, the proposal
was not made.
A later Governor General of the Philippines, appointed in 1922
by President Coolidge, was Henry Stimson. Stimson had been a
junior partner in the New York law firm of Elihu Root, a military
officer in Cuba with Roosevelt, and a Secretary of War to
88 Karnow, supra note 79, at 245.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Burton F Beers, VAIN ENDEAVOR: ROBERT LANSING'S ATTEMPTS TO END THE
AMERICAN-JAPANESE RIVALRY 109 (1962).
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President Taft, again a military officer in France, and a
troubleshooter for the Coolidge Administration. He brought great
prestige to the office and was, like Taft and Harrison, well
received by Filipinos. While Governor General, he won favor by
addressing Filipinos as his "fellow countrymen," entertaining the
local elite in the Malacafion Palace, and addressing Manuel
Quezon, their leader, in precisely the same tones as "if [he] had
been an American sitting at his council table as the senior member
of his official family." 92  But, like his fellow Republican Taft,
Stimson disfavored early independence, arguing instead for a
dominion status for the islands, an idea that found favor neither in
the Philippines nor in the United States. 93
From the beginning, the Americans present in the Philippines,
like those who first appeared in Hawai'i, were keenly interested in
education. Their objectives in establishing public education in the
Islands mirrored those of Horace Mann and other early advocates
of public education in America: they believed that literacy and a
measure of sophistication was a prerequisite to democratic
citizenship. Quite reasonably, they perceived that educated
Filipinos would be more likely to find their own way to
democratic traditions. Taft explained this shared view:
I am aware that our plans for education have been the subject of
considerable criticism by men whose experience in Eastern
countries entitles their view to great weight, on the ground that
by giving education to the people we unfit them for agricultural
and other manual pursuits and inspire them with a desire to
succeed only as clerks and professional men. That the result of
higher education upon a people unfitted by training and moral
stamina to use it to good purpose may be productive of evil need
not here be denied or discussed. That superficial education
frequently produces discontent and brings about social
disturbances may also be conceded. The condition, however,
which is most productive of social disturbances is the existence
of a vast mass of ignorant people easily and blindly led by the
comparatively few of their superficially educated countrymen
92 Manuel Luis Quezon, THE GOOD FIGHT 146-47 (1946).
93 Stimson's position in independence is examined in GODFREY HODGSON, THE
COLONEL: THE LIFE AND WARS OF HENRY STIMSON 1866-1950 122-141 (1990); his
experience in the islands is recorded in HENRY L. STIMSON & McGEORGE BUNDY, ON
ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 128-152 (1948).
[Vol. XX-XIII
WRITING OTHER PEOPLES' CONSTITUTIONS
into insurrection and lawless violence without any definite
knowledge or certainty as to the beneficial results therefrom.
The theory upon which we justify, even on political grounds, the
spread of education is that the more the mass of ignorant persons
is reduced in number by diffusing among them common school
education, the less likely are they to be led away by degenerate
political fakirs... 9
Thousands of American schoolteachers spent their careers in
the Philippines. Necessarily, this effort had the secondary
consequence of disseminating the English language throughout the
archipelago.
In 1910, an American-style law school was established at the
University of the Philippines. The founding dean was George
Malcolm, a then recent graduate of the University of Michigan
Law School and former Clerk to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
Malcolm served the school for seven years before moving on to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines, where he remained for
eighteen years. 95 Other law schools followed, and Malcolm's
University of the Philippines College of Law was admitted to
membership in the Association of American Law Schools so that
its faculty could be socialized to American law professors'
presumably correct sense of their roles. Also among the American
law teachers to serve in the Philippine government was Eugene
Gilmore from the University of Wisconsin.96 Gilmore was a
native Nebraskan who had studied law at Harvard and then moved
on to an academic career. He spent a semester at the University of
the Philippines in 1917. He was well-liked among the Filipino
students and was "successful in upgrading the curriculum and
reorganizing the law library., 97 His semester there led in 1922 to
his appointment by President Harding as Vice-Governor General.
In that position, he also served as Secretary of the Department of
.Public Instruction, thereby overseeing education, public health and
94 John Bancroft Devins, AN OBSERVER IN THE PHILIPPINES 204-205 (1905).
95 Malcolm recorded his experience as an educator in Changes in the College of
Law, 4 PHILIPPINE L. J. 13, 13-15 (1914); Farewell Address of George A. Malcolm on
Retiring as Dean of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, 4 PHILIPPINE L. J.
5 (1914).
96 Gilmore's career is recounted in Paul D. Carrington & Erika King, Law and The
Wisconsin Idea, 47 J. LEG. ED. 297, 318 (1997).
97 Id. at 336.
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sanitation, and quarantines. Under Gilmore's direction, "the
public school system of the Philippines was greatly expanded
(both in geographical reach and enrollment figures) and the public
health system much improved." 9  He served also as overseer of
private schools and Chairman of the Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines. And, fittingly for a Wisconsin
Progressive, he introduced Filipinos to "The Wisconsin Idea" that
a public university could and should be an instrument for
progressive social reform, serving to keep the people and the
legislature well informed of the need for changes in law or
policy.99
Other American lawyers, like Malcolm, served in the Filipino
judiciary. During its early decades, a majority of its members
were Americans. Among the initial Justices of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines were Charles Willard, who had been a federal
district judge in Minnesota; James Smith, formerly a San
Francisco lawyer; Joseph Cooper, a member of the Texas Bar; and
Fletcher Ladd, a recent graduate of the Harvard Law School. The
American members served to introduce the Filipinos to the Anglo-
American doctrine of precedent and to the principle of judicial
review of legislation. Published opinions of the highest court
became customary, and judge-made law in the American tradition
was superimposed on the Roman system brought to the
Philippines by the Spanish. Also, much of the text of the
Constitution of the United States bearing on individual rights was
perpetuated in the Philippine Constitution. l00
These missionaries generally underestimated the difficulty of
their mission. Their optimism regarding the political, cultural, and
religious perceptions overlooked the acute mistrust resulting from
divisions of ethnicity and class that pervaded the island
populations. Tribal loyalties constituted as great an impediment to
self-government among Filipinos as they had among the native
population on the continent of North America. Conceivably, it
was worse because it was reinforced by the topography of an
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 For a description of the court and the constitution see Joseph Ralston Hayden,
THE PHILIPPINES: A STUDY IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 49-50, 823 (1942) (containing the
language of the Philippine bill of rights and describing its development).
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archipelago, and by the policy of divisiveness pursued for three
centuries by Spanish viceroys. The mutual trust on which stable
institutions of self-government depend (as Professor Woodrow
Wilson had himself emphasized) was absent among Filipinos and
could not be provided externally, at least not without a much
larger investment than the United States was willing or able to
make.
Also overlooked by the optimists was the authoritarian aspect
of religion as practiced in the Philippines, whether Catholic or
Muslim. That characteristic reflected cultural traits of domination
still common throughout Asia that seem to be associated with the
cultivation of rice as the staple food, an activity calling for a high
degree of social and political organization.01 This hierarchical
stratification was subsequently incorporated into the Filipinos
constitution in 1935: they created a very powerful executive
empowered to suspend its provisions. Manuel Quezon, the first
President of the Commonwealth, could say at his inauguration:
"The good of the state, not the good of the individual, must
prevail."'0 2 Those peasants enabled to read these words would
have recognized them as a threat to the interests of the
disenfranchised, as indeed they proved to be.
Finally, the step that most needed to be taken if the Philippines
were to become a stable democracy was not taken. That step was
land reform.10 3 This would have required a demotion of the status
and power of the caciques and a denigration of their property
rights. At least in the decades in which the United States
exercised colonial power, this was not done. Still, at the end in
1946, there were millions of feudal peasants."°4 The importance of
land reform was not overlooked, and a brief effort in that direction
was made.'0 5 It was, however, politically impossible in part
because the American regime in the islands depended on the
support of the caciques, and in part because such a relocation of
101 See Fernand Braudel, THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE: THE LIMITS OF THE
POSSIBLE (Sidn Reynolds trans., New York 1981).
102 Karnow, supra note 79, at 255.
103 Tony Smith, AMERICA'S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 52-53 (1994).
104 See id. at 53-59.
105 Id. at 55-57.
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economic power was anathema to many Americans sharing the
class-centered thinking of Governeur Morris. On that account,
when the United States relinquished power, there was an active
Communist movement among the peasants on Mindanao that had
been raging there since 1930. 106
Thus, in the Philippines, American-style democracy proved to
be merely a fig leaf for the control of a hegemonic elite. Its
secondary result was the oppressive rule of Ferdinand Marcos
established in the 1960s and enduring for two decades. American
political evangelism effected social change that was at best skin
deep. American imperialism of the traditional European sort
involving colonies was soon spent, but the American firms making
markets in the Philippines were well served because Filipino
caciques (like Hawaiian ali'i) quickly learned to buy and use
American goods. In the second half of the century, Filipinos
strived on their own to establish stable democratic law with
America as a frequent model, but whether at the century's end
closer to the goal of the evangelists is uncertain. It remains still a
deeply divided society. There was a moment of irony in 2003
when the President of the United States cited the Philippines as a
model for what America can do for Iraq °7 and, presumably, other
nations lucky enough to be subjected to American rule for forty
years.
E. Siam
Quite different but notable efforts were made by American
lawyers to advise the King of Siam on international law and on the
development of legal institutions. From 1902 to 1949, the King
retained the services of an American advisor. The considerations
leading to that choice were that the British and French Empires
had the kingdom hemmed in with competing claims to territory,
while the Dutch, German and Japanese Empires were obviously
ambitious to acquire new provinces. 10 8 King Chulalongkorn, who
106 It is apparently still raging. See Reds Seize, Free Dozens of Hostages in
Mindanao, Manila Standard Today, August 24, 2006, available at
http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/?page=news04-aug24-2006.
107 DAVID E. SANGER, Bush Cites Philippines as Model in Rebuilding Iraq, N. Y.
TIMES, October 19, 2003, at 1, 20.
108 On the situation in 1902, see JOHN G. D. CAMPBELL, SIAM IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: BEING THE EXPERIENCES AND IMPRESSIONS OF A BRITISH OFFICIAL (London
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ruled for forty-two years, concluded that the domestic talents
available to him for the conduct of foreign relations were not
adequate to the enormous challenge. He therefore sought the
advice of foreigners whom he hoped he could trust.' 9
The first person retained by King Chulalongkorn to fill his
needs was a Belgian. The Belgian was found by the Siamese to be
tactless and "overly legalistic." A decision was then made in 1902
to seek an American to advise the King. Admiral Dewey's
triumph at Manila and the presence of anti-imperial sentiments in
the United States made it the place to look for less threatening
help.
The new position was first offered to John Bassett Moore a
professor of law at Columbia, but he declined. Edward Henry
Strobel, a Harvard law professor, was then hired. He was a native
of South Carolina who had studied law at Harvard, practiced in
New York for four years, and performed diplomatic service in the
United States Department of State in Spain, Ecuador, and Chile
before his appointment at Harvard in 1898. He was recommended
to the Siamese by Harvard President Charles Eliot, who admired
Strobel's "social address." It was also pertinent that he was fluent
in five languages." He was joined in Bangkok in 1904 by Jens
Westengard, a junior colleague on the Harvard faculty.''
Strobel's primary responsibility as General Advisor was to
conduct the foreign relations of the kingdom. Winning the
confidence of the King and other Siamese leaders, he managed to
settle the various problems with France, and had made good
progress in resolving problems with Britain when he died in 1908.
He also succeeded in securing royal promulgation of domestic
legislation governing corporate organization, harbor regulation,
and secret societies.
Strobel was succeeded by Jens Westengard, who remained in
Siam until 1915. Westengard was a native of Chicago who had
1902).
109 KENNETH T. YOUNG, The Special Role of American Advisors in Thailand 1902-
1949, 14 ASIA 1, (1969).
110 A short biography of Strobel is provided THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: 1817-1917 263-265 (1918).
111 See ROBERT L. RAYMOND, JENS IVERSON WESTENGARD: A TRIBUTE 5 (Privately
Printed 1919).
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sold real estate for several years before attending law school. As a
student, he made so favorable an impression on the law faculty
that he was elevated to assistant professor immediately on
graduation." 2 He and his young wife had invited the older
bachelor, Strobel, to live with them, thus cementing the connection
between the two men.
Westengard was, if possible, even more successful than
Strobel in winning the confidence of the Siamese. As he
explained his position to President Eliot, he had no power or
authority except such as he might gain by being persuasive with
respect to a particular matter." 3 He was elevated to the office of
General Advisor in 1909. He completed the negotiations with
Britain and managed to persuade the European governments to
withdraw their consular courts, thus subjecting their nationals to
the jurisdiction of Siamese courts. To assist in making the
Siamese judiciary credible, he took a position on the highest court
of Siam, sitting only on those cases of greatest concern to foreign
powers. In 1911, he was also appointed to represent Siam as a
judge available to the international tribunal sitting at The Hague.
It does not appear that he ever sat on a case in that forum, but he
retained the position even after he left Siam.
Westengard was also instrumental in the construction of a
railroad from Bangkok to Singapore, and was at times preoccupied
with the status of Chinese immigrants. The key to his success was
his tact and modesty. He wisely observed that
It is the highest good I have done here if I never know whether
my remarks had anything to do with accomplishing the desired
result.... The best things I have done are not known, sometimes
not even to myself, and I can do most good by retiring as far as
possible from the appearance of driving the machine.
114
Like Wigmore in Japan, Westengard treated the local culture
with respect. He did not advocate a constitutional scheme of the
American sort. It was not his place to do so. He and Strobel were,
however, instrumental in repairing the dyke that prevented Siam
from being overrun by imperialists. The British in particular
112 Id. at4.
113 Westengard to Charles Eliot, April 9, 1912, in Box 2-4, Westengard Papers,
Harvard Law Library (examined by author).
114 Young, supra note 109, at 31.
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resented the role of the Americans and remained a continuing
threat to Siamese sovereignty.
Westengard returned to Harvard in 1915 as the Bemis
Professor of International Law, but died in the influenza epidemic
of 1918. He was succeeded in Bangkok by a series of American
advisors, none of whom acquired his stature in Siam. Two of
these, Eldon James and Francis Sayre, were also members of the
Harvard Law faculty. In 1932, the first Thai constitution was
ratified. It marked the end of the absolute monarchy. The first
draft of the constitution was prepared in 1926 by Sayre in
conformity with the king's directions, and introduced the nation to
the techniques of representative government."15  It would be
replaced several times before the end of the century, but served as
the base for the stabilizing reign of King Bhumibol, a reign that
commenced in 1946 and continues at the present time."
16
F. Japan
Americans would return to the challenge of writing other
peoples' constitutions in 1945. The stated purpose of the
requirement of unconditional surrender imposed on Germany and
Japan was to assure an opportunity to punish war criminals, but it
also facilitated programs of reconstruction not unlike those
imposed on the former Confederate states in 1865. Thus, the
Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 proclaimed on behalf of the
triumphant Allies:
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a
race or destroyed as a nation, but stem justice shall be
meted out to all war criminals, including those who have
visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese
people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as
well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be
established."1
7
115 KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, KINGS, COUNTRY AND CONSTITUTIONS:
THAILAND'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1932-2000 86 (2003).
116 See id. at 45.
117 Potsdam Declaration §10. For an account of the conference producing the
Declaration, see HERBERT FEIS, BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE
(1960).
20071
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Thus, Japan would be required explicitly to embrace the
Declaration of Independence.
President Truman was a rookie President who had not as Vice
President even been informed of the atom bomb project. His new
Secretary of State was James Byrnes, an orphan, who had limited
formal education and had trained as a lawyer in an office in South
Carolina. He had practiced law in that state before his elevation to
the United States Senate.' 18 In 1945, he was familiar with neither
Germany nor Japan, but he was the main player at the Potsdam
Conference at the conclusion of the war in Europe, and was
perhaps the person most responsible for the decision to use the
atomic bomb." 9
On matters pertaining to the occupation of the two former
enemy nations, Bymes was advised by Henry Stimson and John
McCloy, the veteran leaders of the War Department. He was
persuaded by them, with particular regard to Japan that
The spiritual disarmament of a people is a much more difficult
task than their physical disarmament. To instill the democratic
concept of the individual in the Japanese requires a major social
revolution. It can be accomplished only if we can make certain
that a whole new generation of Japanese is educated in
accordance with this democratic ideal.
120
This statement, like Jefferson's Declaration conflated
democracy with individualism. It was not imaginable to him, or to
many other Americans, that the Japanese or German people might
prefer to live in a society in which individualism is strictly
constrained to conform behavior to community expectations. But
he clearly perceived that the result sought by those seeking to
spread the American word would have to be an accomplishment of
the Japanese people. How "we can make certain" that they would
achieve it is a question he never tried to answer.
These leaders thus saw the unconditional surrenders as
invitations to assist, but only to assist, in "re-engineering" the
118 For his biography see generally DAVID ROBERTSON, SLY AND ABLE: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES F. BYRNES (1994).
119 Reflections on his role are in JAMES F. BYRNES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD
WAR 49-57 (Kendrick A. Clements ed., 1982).
120 JAMES F.BYRNES, SPEAKING FRANKLY 225 (1947).
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societies that were seen to be hostile to America and its notions. 2'
The occupation governments they created had at least six
important advantages over previous efforts employed by the
United States to democratize former Spanish colonies. First, both
Germany and Japan were devastated physically and morally.
Second, both peoples expected brutal treatment from occupation
forces and were attracted to any signs of common humanity and
respect. Third, both were highly literate societies. Fourth, both
had experience with parliamentary democracy. Fifth, both had
had constitutions, even if they had little experience with judicial
enforcement of those instruments. Sixth, neither was in 1945
afflicted with a ruling class set in its ways and resistant to change;
for their ruling classes were reduced to poverty and impotence.
Ruling classes would in time revive and to some extent restore
themselves, for example, the ruling class in the Confederate States
had revived, but meanwhile the threat of the Soviet Union not only
heightened the incentive of the United States to make potential
allies of its former enemies, but elevated the receptivity of many
Germans and Japanese to affiliation with the United States. For all
these reasons, the two nations were willing and able to reconstruct
themselves in ways congenial to the United States.
Edwin Reischauer offered a generous assessment of the
occupation of Japan:
Never before had one advanced nation attempted to reform the
supposed faults of another advanced nation from within. And
never did the military occupation of one world power by another
prove so satisfactory to the victor and so tolerable to the
vanquished.
122
No doubt this assessment overlooks small blunders and abuses
of power that were inadequately restrained.' 23 But those have over
the ensuing half-century also been largely overlooked by the
people of Japan and their leadership.
There was a measure of irony in the fact that so authoritarian a
121 DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE THE JAPANESE PEOPLE: WORLD WAR II AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 3 (2001).
122 EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 221 (3d ed., New York
1981).
123 For a less generous assessment see JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, FORCED TO BE FREE:
THE ARTIFICIAL REVOLUTION IN JAPAN AND GERMANY 5-6, 14-15, 191-199 (1957).
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person as General Douglas MacArthur should be the leader of the
effort to democratize Japan. 124 It was his original vision that what
was needed was to convert the Japanese to Christianity. To that
end, he imported to Japan millions of Bibles. 125 What became of
them, no one seems to know.
Perhaps the most important accomplishment of MacArthur's
command was the re-writing of the Japanese constitution. As
Stimson had early observed to his colleagues, Japan from 1932 to
1945 had reverted to authoritarian and militaristic ways familiar to
the Japanese from the times preceding the Meiji Restoration. As a
consequence of that Restoration, "[t]he mechanics of democracy"
had by the early 2 0 th century "become familiar, but the philosophy
of democracy had not taken hold" sufficiently to withstand the
imperial ambitions of the military. 126 The Meiji constitution of
1891 contained a bill of rights, but exempted the Emperor from its
constraints, and the military had always asserted that it was acting
on behalf of the Emperor. Nevertheless, even in the late 1930s,
the Supreme Court had on occasion enforced the constitution
against the military.1
27
A non-governmental group of Japanese scholars and
politicians had at the time of the surrender proposed radical
constitutional changes including abolition of the peerage, a bar to
discrimination by birth, status, sex, race, and nationality and a
guarantee of free hospitalization and old age benefits. 128  A
communication from Washington added to this list a proposal to
empower elected local officials, and General MacArthur, the
Supreme Commander, perhaps at the suggestion of a Japanese
advisor, urged a permanent national commitment to pacifism.
A provisional Japanese government created by the occupying
American army was invited to do the job of re-writing the Meiji
See generally WILLIAM RAYMOND MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS
MACARTHUR 1880-1964 (1978) (describing the governing style of MacArthur as
somewhat authoritarian).
125 DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 276, 310 (1964).
126 JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY
94(1991).
127 See BEER & MAKI, supra note 27. On postwar constitutionalism in Japan, see
generally Upham, supra note 25.
128 JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II
355-360 (1999).
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constitution of 1891 with these suggestions in mind. 2 9 The
committee appointed by the provisional government produced a
draft rejecting all of these suggestions. On the advice of General
Courtney Whitney, MacArthur in turn rejected the committee's
draft. 130 Whitney had been MacArthur's personal attorney in pre-
war years and was the direct overseer of the reorganization of the
Japanese government. The decision to reject their draft was made
on February 3, 1946. The next day, Whitney convened a drafting
committee in the ballroom on the sixth floor of the Dai Ichi
Building and gave them eight days to produce a suitable draft.' 3'
The person designated to command the re-writing was Colonel
Charles Kades. Kades was another Wall Street lawyer, and
Harvard Law graduate. He was assisted by Milo Roswell, a
Stanford Law graduate, who had practiced law in Fresno and
participated in Republican politics in California, and by Alfred
Hussey, a graduate of the University of Virginia Law School
described as a "Massachusetts lawyer with a small practice, who
wore his idealism openly."'132 None of the three was well informed
about Japanese history and culture. They were assisted by others
who were somewhat better informed. The most important of these
was Beate Sirota, a Jewish woman born in Vienna and raised in
Tokyo, who was a 1945 graduate of Mills College in California.
133
The Kades team was careful to adhere as closely as possible to
the Meiji Constitution, which had been given to the Japanese
people in 1891 as a gift from the Emperor. Adopting the vision of
monarchy embraced by England in the Glorious Revolution of
1688, they undertook to prescribe the Emperor's powers narrowly
and to enlarge the power of the elected Diet to resemble the British
Parliament. 134 Local governments were created and empowered.
A Supreme Court was commissioned to enforce the constitutional
129 RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING
THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR, 50-78 (2002).
130 Id. at 119.
131 See THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF THE JAPAN'S DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5 (2000); DOWER, supra note 128, at 364-373.
132 Hellegers, supra note 121, at 522.
133 Her autobiography is BEATE GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM: A
MEMOIR (1997).
134 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 129, at 290.
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divisions of power. Its judges were also made accountable to the
electorate; they would be required to stand for popular
confirmation at the first general election after taking their seats,
and again ten years later. This was a variation on the "Missouri
Plan" fashioned for use in American state courts by the American
Judicature Society.
135
A bill of rights was added. At the behest of Sirota, a provision
guaranteeing gender equity was inserted. They also included a
provision prohibiting aggressive war. It was contended that these
new provisions should be unamendable to prevent future fascists
from "abrogate[ing] "rights now accepted as inherent in the state
of man."' 3 6 Kades successfully resisted that contention, observing
that such an expression of mistrust would make change possible
only by revolution. Hussey wrote a preamble to the Japanese
constitution sounding very much like the preamble to the
Constitution of the United States or the Gettysburg Address.
Kades deleted from Hussey's draft language proclaiming that the
"laws of political morality are universal" and "obedience to such
laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own
sovereignty" on the ground that because it did not reflect reality,
its inclusion would weaken the instrument. 1
37
General Whitney then presented the Kades-Hussey-Roswell
draft to the committee appointed by the Japanese government.
3 8
He advised them that MacArthur regarded the draft the Japanese
had prepared as wholly unacceptable, that the Americans' draft
embodied principles MacArthur believed to be demanded by the
Japanese situation, that if they disagreed, it would be impossible to
protect the person of the Emperor, and that MacArthur himself
would take the matter before the Japanese people. 3 9 The Japanese
draftsmen were reduced to tears,'but, after some haggling,
acceded, and the Americans' draft with minor revisions was
135 The model is described in SUSAN B. CARBON & LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL
RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 - 13 (1980).
136 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 129, at 106.
137 HELLEGERS, supra note 121, at 554-56.
138 See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 129, at 111-123; DOWER, supra note 128,
at 374-404.
139 Hellegers, supra note 121, at 527-28.
140 Dower, supra note 128, at 383.
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published. It was a gift of the United States in precisely the sense
that the former constitution had been a gift from the Emperor's
grandfather. The cabinet wanted to delete Hussey's preamble but
was not permitted to do so. As published, it was publicly
supported by a Prime Minister who privately reviled it, and by the
Emperor.
The Kades draft was, however, "welcomed and embraced" by
the Japanese people if not by their political leadership.' 4' The
people were not sorry to observe the demise of the militarists who
had led them to disaster and were generally eager to embrace
pacifism. Among the Japanese who influenced the popular
acceptance of democratic reform were Nanbara Shigeru, the
Christian president of the University of Tokyo, and Tanabe
Hajime, a professor of philosophy at the University of Kyoto who
advocated Buddhist repentance for the nation. The parliamentary
Diet in due course approved the American draft with minor
changes.42 The House of Peers approved its own dissolution.
43
The Emperor promulgated it in 1946.' 4 As of this writing, it has
not been amended.
The Supreme Court of Japan was soon housed in a structure
that was, if possible, even more grand than that of the Supreme
Court of the United States. 145 However, it seems that the court was
not to play nearly so grand a role in the national government.
Reflecting the narrow popular base of the legal profession in
Japan, and its more technocratic tradition, the courts of Japan have
a small political base and are mindful of the resulting constraints.
Also, because Japan is not a federation, and has a stable popular
Diet with almost complete legislative responsibility, and is
afflicted with fewer divisions of class or ethnicity, there have been
fewer political demands placed on its judiciary. 1
46
141 McNelly, supra note 131, at 88.
142 Dower,_supra note 128, at 486-504.
143 See Moore & Robinson, supra note 129, at 282-314 (describing the role of the
House of Peers in the constitutional process).
144 Id. at 282.
145 See generally Upham, supra note 25 (discussing the facilities enjoyed by the
Japanese judiciary).
146 PERCY R. LUNEY, JR., THE JUDICIARY: ITS ORGANIZATION AND STATUS IN THE
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN- THE FIFTH DECADE: 11 GOVERNMENT
PROCESSES AND THE SEPARATE OF POWERS, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 140-42
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G. Germany
The writing of a new Basic Law in Germany proceeded quite
differently and was at least equally successful. At Potsdam, as
Stimson, McCloy and Byrnes had insisted, it was resolved by the
Allied leaders meeting in the ashes of Nazi Germany, that they
would not destroy or enslave the German people, but would allow
for the "eventual reconstruction of German political life on a
democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in
international life" 147 While economic motives were present in the
management of the second occupation of Germany in 1945-1949,
they were distinctly secondary to political ones, especially so as
the rivalry with the Soviet Union sharpened in 1946.148
While Germany was for a time divided into four zones of
occupation, the American zone was almost instantly democratized
with the holding of municipal elections. 149  Members were also
soon selected for constitutional conventions for the regional
ldnder. Hesse, Wtrtemburg-Baden, and Bavaria were functioning
democratic governments in 1946.1"° In January 1948, at American
initiative, the eleven German Idnder within the British, French,
and American zones were invited to call a constitutional
convention to draft an instrument to "protect the rights of the
participating states, provide adequate central authority, and
contain guarantees of individual rights and freedoms..''. The
stated hope was that the Germans would solve their own
constitutional problems and that is largely what happened.1
5 2
(1990).
147 Potsdam Declaration Part 2(A)(3); see generally MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, THE
CONQUERORS: ROOSEVELT, TRUMAN AND HE DESTRUCTION OF HITLER'S GERMANY, 194 1-
45 (2002).
148 See CAROLYN WOODS EISENBERG, DRAWING THE LINE: THE AMERICAN DECISION
TO DIVIDE GERMANY: 1944-1949 459 (1996).
149 See LUCIUS D. CLAY, DECISION IN GERMANY 11-19 (1950) (discussing the
conditions of occupied Germany immediately after the war).
150 EDMUND SPEVACK, ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM: AMERICAN
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON THE FRAMING OF THE WEST GERMAN BASIC
LAW 81-112 (2001).
151 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 9
(1994).
152 See CLAY, supra note 149, at 281-305 (discussing the Allied attempts to
establish trust and foster democracy in occupied Germany).
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A Parliamentary Council was created by the eleven Inder. It
produced a draft Basic Law. When the Allied High Command led
by General Clay insisted that the first draft provided for too much
centralization and inadequate deference to the role of the lander,
modifications were made without staining the instrument with
American authorship. 5 3 It took effect on May 23, 1949. The
person who mediated between the draftsmen and General Clay
was Carl Joachim Friedrich, a German emigrant who had settled in
the political science department at Harvard.'54
Reasonable minds have since differed on the degree of
American influence on its text.155 General Clay later admitted that
he went beyond his directives from Washington in an effort to
shape it. There is no doubt that most German citizens were
between 1945 and1949 involved in material questions and in their
own survival, and were not generally attentive to abstract political
issues of constitutional import. 15 6 It is not unlikely that Germans
and Americans were each eager to allow the other to think of the
text as theirs. While it seems unlikely that the German authors
would have embraced the principles of federalism absent
American influence, the resulting text was otherwise distinctively
German. Many features of the American Constitution were
considered and rejected. No American lawyer participated in the
drafting.
The Basic Law features a Bill of Rights more extensive than
any familiar to the American experience.5 7 Human dignity was
proclaimed as the first and most fundamental right. 158 It is
enforced by a constitutional court with broader political
responsibility than is conferred on American courts. That court's
lack of timidity was demonstrated in 1975 when it held that the
153 See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, Lucius D. CLAY: AN AMERICAN LIFE 387-395 (1990).
154 See id. at 231, 391.
155 See Spevack, supra note 150, at 13-33; JOHN FORD GOLAY, THE FOUNDING OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27-112 (1958); MICHAEL J. BAUM, The Federal
Republic of Germany in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 79-80 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds. 1995).
156 See RICHARD L. MERRITT, DEMOCRACY IMPOSED: U. S. OCCUPATION POLICY AND
THE GERMAN PUBLIC: 1945-1949 328-30 (1995).
157 For a definitive work comparing the Bills of Rights, see generally CURRIE, supra
note 151.
158 Id. at 11.
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duty of the state to protect human dignity required that it make
abortion a crime.159
The Constitutional Court's judges are chosen half by the
Bundestag whose members are directly elected by the people and
half by the Bundesrat whose members are appointed by the
legislatures of the lander.160  By statute, the judges on the
Constitutional Court serve twelve-year terms and are not eligible
for reappointment, so there is no structural incentive to make
popular decisions. 16' The court is divided into two panels
expected to respect one another's decisions as precedents. 162 The
Basic Law can be amended by supermajorities of the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat.16 3 It was amended thirty-five times in its first
forty years.1 64
Whether the German Basic Law as enforced by the
Constitutional Court is an advance over its American counterpart
might be usefully debated. Certainly it is a creature of pre-existing
German law and culture. David Currie has observed that the
"basic principle of freewheeling judicial review [by the
Constitutional Court] is reminiscent of that which gave us Scott v.
Sandford, Lochner v. New York, and Roe v. Wade., 165 But, as he
also observes, it may fit the political context. He concludes that:
Unlike their American counterparts during the Lochner years,
the German judges do not seem often to have blocked desirable
or even fairly debatable reforms; they do seem to have spared
their compatriots a flock of unjustified restrictions on liberty and
property.
66
And he concludes that the Basic Law must be regarded as "a
resounding success.' 67
159 DONALD P. KOMMERS, Liberty and Community in Constitutional Law: The
Abortion Cases in Comparative Perspective, 1985 BYU L. REV. 371, 372, 377-379
(1985); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 25-33 (1987).
160 CURRIE, supra note 151, at 26-27.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 29-30.
163 Id. at 375.
164 Id. at 30.
165 Id. at 337.
166 Id. at 338.
167 Id. at 339.
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The military occupation of Germany ought be assessed at least
in part on the value of that resounding success. The occupation
government has been subjected to sometimes searing criticism by
scholars. Perhaps most trenchant was George Kennan's protest
against Americans living (as Americans are prone to do when the
opportunity is presented) in ostentatious luxury, even amid the
ruins and horrors of war. 168 No doubt there were many, many acts,
official as well as unofficial, that were mean or stupid. One can
neither prove nor disprove the hypothesis that a different approach
to Germany could have prevented the Cold War. Nor can one
deny that American motives to favor German initiative were
associated with the selfish motive of impeding Soviet efforts to
incorporate all of Germany into its network. But the occupation of
Germany was, at the end of the day, a success in the only way that
it could have succeeded, by enabling Germans to make the best
democratic government they as Germans were then capable of
making.
H. Israel
The Zionist Movement aiming to establish a Jewish homeland
in Palestine first became a significant political force in the early
years of the 2 0 th century. In part, it was a response to the rise of
nationalism in Europe. But it had roots in Biblical texts promising
that the Son of God would return if the Jews did.'69 More than a
few English Protestants had envisioned such a return and lent
support to the Zionist idea.17° And some American Protestants not
only shared that vision, but had since the eighteenth century been
sending religious missionaries to the Ottoman Empire in the hope
of advancing the cause.'71 The Movement gained strength among
European and American Jews in the 1880s when the Czar
sponsored pogroms against his Jewish subjects.172  A need
168 GEORGE F. KENNAN, MEMOIRS 1925-1950 428-29 (1967).
169 See DAVID VITAL, THE ORGINS OF ZIONISM 3-20 (1975) (describing the positions
and beliefs of Jews related to the restoration of the Jewish State).
170 See BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, BIBLE AND SWORD: ENGLAND AND PALESTINE FROM
THE BRONZE AGE TO BALFOUR 121-146 (Alvin Redman 1956).
171 See generally MICHAEL B. OREN, POWER, FAITH AND FANTASY: AMERICA IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 1776 TO THE PRESENT (2007).
172 DAVID VITAL, A PEOPLE APART: THE JEWS IN EUROPE 1789-1939 283-290 (1999)
(describing the 1880 pogroms in Russia)
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
appeared for a Jewish homeland as a sanctuary for those
unwelcome in Eastern Europe.173 Zionism was, however,
disapproved by many Jewish persons in Europe, America, and
elsewhere, who favored greater assimilation into the societies in
which they lived, and who feared that the creation of a homeland
would magnify the mistrust of those who saw them as members of
a great world-wide Jewish conspiracy and disloyal to the
communities in which they resided. 
174
Among those favoring a return of eastern European Jews to
Palestine was Louis Brandeis. Brandeis was Jewish but did not
observe Judaism and was a Zionist only because he perceived the
moral teachings of Jewish culture to be important and in need of
preservation, and because he was concerned for victims of
pogroms.175 Brandeis saw the Jewish kibbutzim, communitarian
farms, as institutions fostering those moral values that he most
strongly approved and that he found as a subtext to Jefferson's
Declaration of Independence. He hoped that a Jewish state might
"teach other nations how to live."' 176 On that account, he became
in 1915 the leader of the Zionist Movement in the United States.'77
He dispatched his close friend and ally Felix Frankfurter to attend
the Versailles Peace Conference to advocate the cause. In 1920,
there was a falling out between these American Zionists and the
international organization led by Chaim Weizman on the question
of the status of the Palestinian population whom Weizman
proposed to buy out and remove to make room for a state
committed to the advancement of the Jewish faith.'78
The British imperial government governed Palestine for the
next quarter century without resolving the issue. Among the Jews
immigrating to Palestine during that period were a handful of
173 BEN HALPERN & JEHUDA REINHARZ, ZIONISM AND THE CREATION OF A NEW
SOCIETY 40-41 (1998).
174 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, AMERICAN ZIONISM FROM HERZL TO THE HOLOCAUST
(1975).
175 See PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 224-47 (1984)
(describing Brandeis' identification with fellow Jews and association with the Zionist
movement).
176 On the politics of Brandeis, see id. at 237-47.
177 Halpem & Reinharz, supra note 173, at 177.
178 JEHUDA REINHARZ, CHAIM WEIZMANN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 292-303
(1993).
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Americans. Among them was Simon Agranat, a native of
Louisville, the son of Russian immigrants, and a graduate of the
University of Chicago Law School, who followed his parents
when they moved to Haifa in 1930."79 As a youth, he had been
deeply troubled by a sense that American Jews were people
without a country; 180 he greatly admired his fellow native of
Louisville, Louis Brandeis, and was much troubled by the rupture
between Brandeis and Weizmann. Before going, he consulted his
luminous Jewish law professor, Ernst Freund, a close friend of
Brandeis. Freund expressed the anti-Zionist sentiment shared by
most American Jews in the 1920s."8' He dismissed as foolish
Agranat's idea of moving to Palestine.
Nevertheless, Agranat went. He took a clerkship with a lawyer
in Jerusalem that would qualify him to practice law in the
Mandate. As a lawyer, he often represented illegal Jewish
immigrants seeking refuge from European anti-Semitism. While
much troubled in doing so, in 1940 he pledged allegiance to the
British Crown to become a citizen of Palestine, as he needed to do
in order to become a judge.1 82 Yet he remained an ardent fan of
the Chicago Cubs baseball team, remained keenly interested in
American Civil War history, and continued all his life to speak
English with a marked Chicago accent.'83
By 1946, with full disclosure of the extent of the Nazi
holocaust, Jewish demands for a nation of their own had become
militant. That summer, the Jewish group Irgun blew up the King
David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing ninety-one people including
numerous officers of the Mandatory Government. 184 The British
government was not prepared either to resist or support the
demand, and so it turned the mandatory responsibility over to the
new United Nations in January 1947.185 After studying the matter,
179 See PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT
AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 3-39 (1997).
180 Id. at 210-213.
181 See id. at 29-31.
182 Id. at 63-64.
183 Id. at xv-xvii.
184 TOM SEGEV, ONE PALESTINE, COMPLETE: JEWS AND ARABS UNDER THE BRITISH
MANDATE 476-478 (1999).
185 Id. at 495.
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the United Nations General Assembly voted, over the heated
protest of all its Arab members, to partition Palestine and create
separate states for Jews and Palestinians.1
86
The British left Palestine on May 13, 1948. War erupted in the
streets. The next day, Israel issued a Declaration of Independence.
This action was taken partly on the advice of a group of influential
Americans that included Felix Frankfurter, by then himself a
Supreme Court Justice, who had come around to support the idea
of a Jewish state. After the Declaration was issued, the Truman
Administration gave its putative government de facto
recognition. 187 By 1947, most Americans had come to share that
view. Among them for example, was Henry Morgenthau, Jr., a
member of the cabinet and the son of the ambassador who had so
sternly opposed Zionism in 1919.188
On the other hand, those responsible for thinking about
international relations were universally opposed to active
American support of a Zionist state.189 The State Department led
by General George Marshall was outspoken.' 90  Indeed, the
Secretary at one point advised the President that he would not vote
for his re-election if he supported partition of Palestine and the
creation of Israel.19' His strong view was shared by the lawyers in
the State Department including Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett,
by George Kennan's departmental planning staff,192 and by the
new Central Intelligence Agency. 9' Their shared view was that
Zionism in the form of a secular state was an affront to the rights
of Palestinians to self-government, that it could not in the
foreseeable future be sold to the peoples of any Arab state and
would result in prolonged war in the region, that it would earn the
186 Id.
187 PETER GROSE, ISRAEL IN THE MIND OF AMERICA 300 (1983).
188 See id. at 81, 181, 196-97.
189 See WALTER ISAACSON & EVAN THOMAS, THE WISE MEN: Six FRIENDS AND THE
WORLD THEY MADE 451-453 (1986) (discussing the recognition of Israel and noting that
there was great opposition from a foreign policy front from Marshall, Lovett, Forrestal,
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enduring enmity to the United States of Muslim peoples from
Morocco to Indonesia, that it would threaten the sources of oil
needed to make a success of the Marshall Plan for the recovery of
Europe, and that it risked placing the Arab states on the side of the
Soviet Union in the unfolding Cold War, a contest that they
foresaw as a hot war in the making. Secretary Marshall
characterized the support of partition as "starting a fire with no
means of putting it out."' 94 He was insistent that neither domestic
politics nor Deuteronomy should bear on the decision. Other
means would need to be found to shelter the holocaust survivors.
He was supported by James Forrestal, the Secretary of Defense,
who was firm in the belief that non-existent American military
resources would be needed to effect partition. 195
The State and Defense Departments were opposed by the
political advisors on the White House staff who were responsible
for the re-election of the President.'96 On their advice, the
President overruled the State and Defense Departments and the
Central Intelligence Agency and recognized the secular state.
Warren Austin, the Ambassador to the United Nations and
formerly a Republican Senator from Vermont, a sometime village
lawyer, did not resign, but he refused to express support for
partition, leaving that task to his subordinates. 
197
The decision to support partition was probably inevitable. It
was clear that Truman's Republican adversaries were committed
to that program, and it seems reasonably certain that Truman's
surprising victory in the election would not have occurred had the
President followed the course laid out by the Department of State.
While there was enormous political pressure brought to bear on
both parties by Jewish Americans reacting to the holocaust, the
cause was not one felt by Jews alone, but had very widespread
support.
In the three years following the Israeli Declaration of
Independence in 1948, almost 700,000 Jews migrated to Israel.
194 JAMES FORRESTAL, THE FORRESTAL DIARIES 373 (Walter Millis ed., 1951).
195 Id. at 372-74.
196 CLARK CLIFFORD, & RICHARD HOLBROOKE, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A
MEMOIR 3-6 (1991).
197 See GEORGE T. MAZUZAN, WARREN R. AUSTIN AT THE U.N. 1946-1953 at 111-
115 (1977).
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The flow would continue. A handful of these immigrants were
Americans, and a very few were American lawyers. Meanwhile,
in 1949, Simon Agranat was appointed to the Supreme Court of
Israel.' 98 In 1953, he wrote the opinion of the court justifying a
decision to impose judicial review of legislation on the enactments
of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.' 99 This decision was said to
rest on John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, but there
was the difference that Israel had no written constitution. This
remains so although a written constitution was favored by the
United Nations partition decision of 1947 and was promised by the
Israeli Declaration of Independence. In a 1953 opinion of the
court by Justice Agranat, explicit reliance was placed in part on
the wisdom of Zechariah Chafee's writings in the Harvard Law
Review. 00 It was not coincidental that the court's library had
recently received a complete set of the Review as a gift from a
New York lawyer, a gift solicited by Agranat. Also cited in the
opinion were Louis Brandeis, Learned Hand, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and Thomas Jefferson.20'
In 1965, Agranat was elevated to Chief Justice and he served
on the court until 1976. His influence on his court corresponded
to the advice of Felix Frankfurter given to an Israeli Attorney
General in the early years of the republic, that Israel did not need a
written constitution, but did need an independent judiciary willing
to enforce natural law.202 Frankfurter's advice was contrary to that
of the other eight Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States, all of whom counseled the need for a constitutional text,
but his view prevailed. There are "basic laws" in Israel that have
special status in that it is agreed that they will be modified only by
a supermajority of the Knesset, but the Israeli constitution
remained inorganic, a compound of these basic laws with judicial
pronouncements and religious teachings. Yet references to
198 See Lahav, supra note 179, at 79-89.
199 "Kol Ha'Am" Company Limited v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871 (1953),
reprinted in SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 90 (1962).
200 Id. at 104-14.
201 Id. at 96-108.
202 On Frankfurter's influence, see GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 95-100 (1993).
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American decisions are common.203 A successor of Agranat,
Aharon Barak further expanded the role of the judiciary in the
Israeli scheme of government; it was not a coincidence that he
spent a month a year on vacation from his judicial duties in
residence at American law schools. °4
A close observer concluded that:
[T]he influence of the U. S. Constitution ... in Israel has been
fairly subtle, confined largely, although not exclusively, to the
realms of adjudication, and the legal academy. From these
places American influence has radiated into the political arena;
thus, for example, law professors, armed with American cases
and jurisprudential theory, have played the catalytic role in
mobilizing support for constitutional reform. . . [T]hey have not
been wedded to the American constitutional approach, but they
have borrowed extensively from it.
205
Thus, to the extent that the ideas expressed in the American
Declaration of Independence and Constitution have found their
way into the government and law of Israel, it is because Israelis,
Simon Agranat and Aharon Barak among them, willed it to be
SO.
20 6
III. Other More Recent Constitutions
Many other new nations emerged in the same period in which
Israel emerged. The Japanese and Italian Empires were
dismantled by the war, creating new nations in Asia and Africa.
The British, French, Belgian, and Dutch Empires dissolved in the
decade following the war, sometimes in response to uprisings, but
often in the end voluntarily, reflecting the commitment made in
the Atlantic Charter and the growing distaste of Europeans for the
exercise of imperial might. The vestiges of the ancient empires of
203 See Aharon Barak, Some Reflections on the Israeli Legal System and Its
Judiciary, 6.1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2002) available at, http://www.ejcl.org/61/art6l - .html.
204 On Barak's connection with American law schools, see Emily Bazelon, Let
There Be Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May-June 2002, at 25-32, available at
http://www.legataffairs.org/issues/May-June-2002/feature-bazelon-mayjun2002.msp.
205 JACOBSOHN, supra note 202, at 11.
206 See generally Neta Ziv, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Combining
Professionalism, Nation-Building and Public Service: The Professional Project of the
Israeli Bar 1928-2002, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1621 (2003) (examining the formation and
development of the Israeli legal profession).
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Portugal and Spain were also dissolved within another decade.
Most of the new nations were deeply riven with cultural
differences of race, religion, caste, tribe, language, and sexual
mores making mutual trust between citizens unlikely. Such
differences were almost certain to give rise to domestic conflict
among groups having unequal prospects of survival in modem
nations participating in international trade. The populations of
many formerly colonial states did not soon form national identities
imposing on their member-citizens mutual obligations of respect
that might mitigate such entrenched rivalries as religious and
ethnic differences.
Those new nations drafting new constitutions were seldom
impressed by the example of American government. Most 2 0 th
century constitutions appear to have adopted a parliamentary
system with a single dominant house choosing its own executive,
although some created independent executives. Guarantees of
individual civil liberties are not necessarily the norm. A few new
nations, mostly those that had been parts of the British Empire,
had legal professions that may have been somewhat better suited
than others to the role envisioned and performed by the American
legal profession in giving life to constitutional government as a
means of providing a stable and democratic social and political
order congenial to economic development. Elsewhere, nascent
democracies under stress caused by ethnic mistrust often lacked a
legal profession capable of providing the confidence in the
integrity of legal institutions needed to mediate ethnic conflict.
One idea drawn from American experience and redolent of the
American influence on the German and Japanese constitutions,
gained currency in the United Nations and among numerous
developing nations in the 1970s. It was the idea of transnational
federation. It was hoped that small nations might gain stability
and mutual strength through the process exemplified in
Philadelphia in 1787. This idea seemed especially timely given
that the former empires had served to connect many smaller
colonies to other smaller colonies in ways that may have been
constructive. Perhaps federations of former co-colonies might
find the resources needed to establish social and political stability
or a market economy. Thomas Franck served as consultant to
several such projects.
Results were not generally encouraging. An East African
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Federation of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar was
momentarily formed, but soon fell apart. The same fate befell a
Central African Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, states later known as Malawi, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. A British West Indian Federation also quickly failed.
Singapore was initially part of the Malaysian Federation, but was
expelled. A Central American Federation was negotiated but
never formed. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia disintegrated.
Franck concluded that neither economic complementarity nor its
opposite could sustain success; the essential ingredient was a
moral "commitment to the political ideal of federation itself."
The trend to constitutional government would experience
another surge in the 1970s. It would accelerate again with the
birth of many new nations at the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War. In 2003, the European Union was at last
at the task of devising a constitution for itself; an effort that seems
for the moment to have failed.
IV. Conclusion
Many of the constitutions written in the late 20 th century were
drafted with the help of American consultants. Many of those
constitutions contain ambitious guarantees of human rights. The
caution has been expressed that "[a] constitution that purports to
guarantee a decent society may, in the process, guarantee nothing
at all." The extent to which many of these developments are
merely cosmetic remains to be seen, and they are not, for that
reason, the subject of this account. It would be unjustifiably
pessimistic to suppose that they will be completely ineffective, at
least where they take root in their respective cultures. But it is
equally unjustifiably optimistic to suppose that any constitutional
text can prevent groups from killing one another when they are
strongly inclined to do so. The words of John Milton and of
Professor Wilson should be kept very much in mind.
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